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Abstract
The growing trend of using wearable devices for
context-aware computing and pervasive sensing
systems has raised its potentials for quick and reliable
authentication techniques. Since personal writing
habitats differ from each other, it is possible to realize
user authentication through writing. This is of great
significance as sensible information is easily collected
by these devices. This paper presents a novel user
authentication system through wrist-worn devices
by analyzing the interaction behavior with users,
which is both accurate and efficient for future usage.
The key feature of our approach lies in using much
more effective Savitzky-Golay filter and Dynamic
Time Wraping method to obtain fine-grained writing
metrics for user authentication. These new metrics
are relatively unique from person to person and
independent of the computing platform. Analyses
are conducted on the wristband-interaction data
collected from 50 users with diversity in gender, age,
and height. Extensive experimental results show that
the proposed approach can identify users in a timely
and accurate manner, with a false-negative rate of
1.78%, false-positive rate of 6.7%, and Area Under
ROC Curve of 0.983 . Additional examination on
robustness to various mimic attacks, tolerance to
training data, and comparisons to further analyze the
applicability.
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1 Introduction
Nowadays the authentication and identification
process of mobile devices are becoming increasingly
important. For instance, many people are using
online banking, and their property are being
threatened directly by potential attacks. In general,
there are three types of authentication factors: (i)
a password or a PIN code; (ii) some substance such
as a security token; (iii) the biometrics feature, such
as fingerprints. The password is the usual way we
use, but [1, 2, 3] have shown that they have some
security problems. The identification by biometrics
features developed nowadays seems to provide a more
accurate and safe approach for authentication. There
are also two types of methods by biometrics traits:
using physiological features such as fingerprint or
iris [4, 5], or using behavioral features such as gait
or keystroke. Moreover, attackers might even get
users’ faces and fingerprints from public events and
then use these biometrics for authentication [10]. In
contrast, some behavior-based methods can be deal
with attackers better because it is more difficult to
be simulated or forged.
1.1 Wrist-worn Devices for Activity
Recognition
Wrist sensing, with data collected from wrist-worn
devices, has many applications. [13] discovered
that wrist activity can help distinguish sleep from
wakefulness. They distinguished in approximately
88% of the time. [14] developed a usage of a novel
usage of wrist motion: They used a watch-like sensors
to continuously track wrist motion throughout the
day and detect periods of eating. They described an
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algorithm that segments and classifies eating periods
and finally obtained an accuracy of 81% for 1-s
resolution.
In the authentication field, some researchers [11]
found the photoplethysmographic (PPG) sensor in
smart-watches, which is usually used for catching
heart rate, could distinguish a specified hand motion
done by the user. Their experiments shown that a
continuous wrist movement of three times achieved
an average error rate of 11.6%, and a movement
of nine times achieved an average error rate of
8.8%. However, the data collected by PPG sensor
might be affected by user’s physical condition in
that a person’s heart rate can be much higher after
strenuous exercise.
1.2 Wrist-Worn Devices for
Behavioral Authentication
Recently authentication by wrist-worn devices come
out with various approaches. [8] developed a
motion-based authentication for wrist worn devices,
by histogram method and dynamic time warping
method. They set some gesture for authentication.
The EER value could be as low as 2.6%. However,
compared to our method, the range of the hand
motion is too large (for example, draw a huge circle
in front of user’s body), which is not convenient in
public places. What’s more, it may be forged and
attacked by attackers, which is not as safe as our
method.
[9] used digital wristband to distinguish user’s
behavior after a user logged in. They analyzed
user’s habit of using mouse and keyboard, and then
deauthenticate the current user or not. They could
verify 85% of users in 11 seconds and 90% in 50
seconds. However, their method mainly solve the
risk that when the user forget to log out after using.
Actually, they have to spend 50 seconds to get 90%
correct rate, with the system running background. In
contrast, our method focuses on instantaneous pass
of authentication.
[12] worked on signature verification by wrist-worn
devices. They successfully determined whether the
signature is genuine or forged. They collected data
with the accelerometer and gyroscope, then extracted
features with dynamic time warping (DTW) and
trained some classifiers. Finally they obtained 0.98
AUC and 0.05 EER. Despite the high accuracy,
there are some disadvantages in comparison with
our method. They require the labels of forged and
genuine signatures to be given. However, we don’t
have forged signature data in practice. Because
limited forged signature data, the system can’t cover
all situations. This will result in an unexpected
classification for other input not included in the
training data. This flaw will be illustrated in detail
in Section 4.5. We only needs genuine signatures and
can distinguish forged signatures automatically.
1.3 Challenges and Contributions
In general, people’s writing behaviors vary greatly
from one to another, but there are still several
challenges. (i) Wrist movement data is hard to
distinguish with small letters, while writing larger
words produces more distinguishable data. In order
to increase the usability and capability to defend
simulated attacks, we restrict the minimum size of
every letter with a square with side length 2cm. (ii)
Data caught by accelerometer and gyroscope can be
different when the same one writes the same word,
since they might move quicker in one letter and slower
in another, or make unexpected stop somewhere. So
we chose DTW(Dynamic Time Warping) algorithm
to cover these complex situations, enabling the
similarities in writing stand out of the discrepancies.
(iii) There is no direct relationship between the path
of wrist and writing information since the former one
does not imply finger movement. As a result, it is not
effective if we simply calculate wrist path from wrist
movement directly for authentication.
Following are some advantages of our method: (1)
Hard to attack. If someone knows the word, the font
is hard to acquire. Even if the attacker knows how
the user writes the word, it is difficult to simulate the
writing habit to forge and through authentication.
Related experiments will demonstrate these. (2)
Efficient and convenient. It does not need much
calculation and can be finished in 1 to 2 seconds.
(3) Fitting in with office or class, where people
usually use a pen. (4) Suitable for protecting some
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extremely important things, such as safety box,
classified documents and so on. Our method can also
provide a secondary password in situations like online
paying.
2 Writing Characterization
2.1 Writing Sensing
Among all available sensors [18], we selected the
accelerometer and the gyroscope, which could
capture wrist movements precisely. Our method is
not restricted by the type of digital devices, since
these two sensors exist in most of the wrist-worn
devices nowadays. The accelerometer measures the
acceleration of the Band in X, Y and Z axes. A
value of 1 means the band is under 1g of acceleration,
where 1g = 9.81(m/s2). The gyroscope measures
the angular velocity of the Band also in X, Y and
Z axes. When the angular velocity is 1 degree per
second (◦/s), the value will be 1.
2.2 Data Collection
Fifty distinct individuals’ wrist movement data are
collected with 62 times per-second sample rate. Each
individual is required to write (using their right
hands) the word ”love” and an arbitrary word with
3 to 5 letters in lowercase, at least 6 times for
each word. In order to capture personal characters
in writing precisely, they are required to keep the
writing speed in their normal level and control the
size of each word to be larger than 10× 3 cm2.
The raw data is recorded as a tuple in sequence
of time, with 6 motion dimensions in each tuple
v(t) = (ax(t), ay(t), az(t), ωx(t), ωy(t), ωz(t)),
which denote the acceleration and angular velocity
along axis X, Y, Z and t denotes time. Finally
we collected 600 samples in total, while each file
describing one person’s wrist movement of a writing
particular word in 6 motion dimensions.
The scenario of collecting raw data is shown in
Fig. 1. Examples of the test data we collected are
shown in Fig.2. The time order is expressed by the
shading of the color, where light color points are
before deep points.
Figure 1: Raw writing data is collected.
2.3 Data Choosing and Filtering
It is hard to extract features in such high dimension,
so we deal with ax, ay, az, ωx, ωy, ωz versus time
respectively in 2-D. For signal denoising and
smoothing, we adopted Savitzky-Golay filter [15], a
digital filter that increases the signal-to-noise ratio
while keeping the features of signal, to preprocess
our data. This is done by fitting successive nearby
data points with a low-degree polynomial. To find
the polynomial, we equally spaced the points and
constructed least-squares equations for solution. In
this paper, we chose each set of 9 successive points
for smoothing and the degree of polynomial is 2. We
had every point filtered except for first four and last
four points, since there is not enough points around
them. For those points, we reduced the length of
the successive points set and did similar process.
The denoising effect is shown in Fig. 3. The main
shape of the curve does not change while the curve
gets smoother. Extremely peak values in a small
neighborhood region are also corrected by S-G filter.
2.4 Distance Measurement
It is necessary to find a robust and efficient algorithm
to measure the distance between two time series.
Actually, two time series share very similar shapes
but not aligned in the time axis. Therefore, the
3
Figure 2: Examples of the test data.
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Figure 3: Raw data and filtered data.
Euclidean distance or L − 1 norm fails to capture
the similarity between them.
The dynamic time warping method (DTW) meets
our requirement [16]. It provides a more intuitive
distance measurement, which is shown in Fig. 4. It
matches two time series with similar shapes, even if
they are not closed under Euclidean distance. Below
is a short explanation for DTW algorithm.
Assuming there are two time series A and B of
length m and n, where
A = (a1, a2, · · · , am); B = (b1, b2, · · · , bn).
Then a m-by-n matrix d is built, where the (ith, jth)
element of d refers to distance between ai and bj :
(ai − bj)2 . Now we want to find a route from (1, 1)
to (m,n). Note the route as R, where R(k) is the kth
points we stand on. The length of R is noted as K.
Then we have
max(m,n) ≤ K < m+ n− 1;
R(1) = (1, 1), R(K) = (m,n);
R(t+ 1)−R(t) ∈ {(0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}.
And we are interested in the path reaching minimum:
DTW (A,B) = min
R

(
K∑
k=1
d(R(k))
) 1
2
 .
The path is solved by dynamic programming, with
Machine Learning Toolbox created by [17]. Define
the cumulative distance s(i, j) and the distance r(i, j)
which have been found in the current cell. We have
s(i, j) = r(i, j) + min{s(i− 1, j − 1), s(i− 1, j), s(i, j − 1)}.
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Figure 4: The DTW bridge.
DTW has very low computational complexity
O(mn).
3 Authentication Architecture
3.1 Overview
The authentication process consists of 4 parts:
sensing, filter, trainer and identifier. The flow chat is
shown in Fig 5.
3.1.1 Sensing
We used data collected from the accelerometer and
the gyroscope of wrist movement to express the
writing behavior.
3.1.2 Filter
We used the S-G filter introduced in Section 2.3. The
original data was smoothed and the points whose
absolute values are extremely large were modified .
3.1.3 Trainer
The DTW distance was selected to do the
authentication. To train our system, we obtained a
group of data by letting the user write the same word
for several times, and then we calculated the ideal
DTW distance of this group of data. This concept is
introduced in the next section.
3.1.4 Identifier
For a given testing data, we calculate the DTW
distance from the testing data to the group of training
data at first, then compare it with the ideal DTW
distance of the group. Finally the total similarity
score of the testing data is calculated to decide
whether to accept or to deny.
Data
Collec�on
Wri�ng 
Sensing
Data
Preprocessing
Training 
Data Group
Tes�ng 
Data
Group 
Ideal DTW 
Distance
DTW to 
Training 
Group
Compare
Total 
Similarity 
Score
Accept Deny
>δ <δ
Figure 5: The Flow chat of our system.
3.2 Group Characteristic
A proper measurement is needed to capture the
similarity within in one person’s writing style while
highlight the discrepancies among people. Actually
we only have one class of data, in that the user sets
the ”password” by writing a certain word for several
times. So we put forward two definitions here:
3.2.1 Group ideal DTW distance
The word ”ideal” means our expectation of testing
data for passing the authentication. If the user
produces a testing data whose DTW distance to the
group is closed to the ideal DTW distance, then the
user could pass the authentication. For a group
of training data D1, D2, · · · , Dn, calculate DTW
distance dij (1 ≤ i ≤ n, i < j ≤ n) between Di and
Dj , where dij = (d
(1)
ij , d
(2)
ij , · · · , d(6)ij ), corresponding
to 6 motion dimensions ax, ay, az, ωx, ωy, ωz. Then
for each k from 1 to 6, choose {d(k)ij }’s upper quartile
e
(k)
ij for ideal distance. From such calculation we get
group ideal DTW distance e = (e(1), e(2), · · · , e(6)).
3.2.2 DTW distance to a group
For testing data T , we intend to measure its distance
to the training group D. During our tests, we found
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the speed of writing and the size of the word were
different each time, although the user was asked to
keep the speed and size. So we calculated the final
DTW distance by proper weights. We calculated
distances by 6 motion dimensions and got {t(k)i },
which means the DTW distance between T and Di
of kth motion dimension. Then we got {t(k)i } sorted
and obtained {tˆ(k)i }, where tˆ(k)i ≤ tˆ(k)j , if i < j.
After that we chose PDF of Poisson Distribution for
weight:
βi =
λi
i!
e−λ, λ =
[n
5
]
, ρi =
βi∑n
j=1 βj
, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Then Final DTW distance is s = (s(1), s(2), · · · , s(6)),
where
s(k) =
n∑
i=1
ρitˆ
(k)
i .
By feature of Poisson Distribution, the weights
mainly distribute near [n/5], and for those distances
ranked over [n/2], the weights are almost 0. That
is, for a given testing data, the more similar training
data is given higher weight when we calculate the
DTW distance from the testing data to the training
group.
As the result, the most outstanding advantage is
to have a high fault tolerance of input training data.
That is, if there are some bad training data mixed
in the training set, the system can automatically
ignore those bad data. The performance of the fault
torlerance will be discussed by experiments later in
section 4.3.
3.3 Similarity Measurement and
Authentication
The judgment happens when a user wants to pass the
authentication. First, the user wears the Band and
writes a word as the testing data. Then the system
calculates the total similarity score between it and
training data. If the score is high enough, the access
query will be accepted, otherwise denied.
Based on these definitions of group, when a testing
data comes into the system, we easily define the
similarity score SS = (SS(1), SS(2), · · · , SS(6)) by 6
motion dimensions:
SS(k) = max
{
e(k)
s(k)
, 1
}
, k = 1, 2, · · · , 6.
Set weight µ = (µ(1), µ(2), · · · , µ(6)) for 6 motion
dimensions, where
∑6
i=1 µ
(i) = 1. Then the TSS
(Total Similarity Score) is
TSS =
6∑
k=1
µ(k)SS(k).
We can simply set µ(1) = µ(2) = · · · = µ(6) = 1/6.
We did AUC test and got better µ for each specific
system. At last we set a threshold δ. If TSS ≥ δ, the
user passes the authentication, otherwise denied.
Another important issue is to complete the
authentication process quickly. The Computational
Complexity of our system is O(Ltn2) since we can
store the ideal DTW distance into the system,
where L denotes the motion dimensions, t denotes
the number of sampling points, and n denotes the
number of training groups.
4 Experiments and Evaluation
In this section several experiments are put forward
to evaluate the performance of our system. We
demonstrate that our system can distinguish well
between the authorized users and different types of
mimic attackers. The system is also well designed
to tolerate some improper input data in the training
data set, and the performance of the system can be
improved if we use the personalized signatures or
patterns as the password.
4.1 Self and Non-Self Discrimination
The first issue is the practicability. We intend
to demonstrate that there is enough discrimination
between authorized users and unauthorized users in
our system. Here is a self-similarity test shown in
Fig 6. We calculated TSS between the password of
each of 7 distinct users, where each training data
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group contains 5 samples. Setting µ(1) = µ(2) =
· · · = µ(6) = 1/6, the result shows that the TSS
from a sample to the group where it is belong to is
much higher than that of other groups. Self-similarity
within each group fits well with our expectation.
User1 User2 User3 User4 User5 User6 User7
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Group1
Group2
Group3
Group4
Group5
Group6
Group7
Figure 6: Self-similarity test on seven distinct users
with five trails for each.
The next step is to show the discrimination in
practical usage. We selected 15 user’s writing data
and trained each user’s system with 5 trails. Under
the threshold δ = 0.55, the result of FNR (false
negative rate) and FPR (false positive rate) is shown
in Fig 7(left), from which we got the average FNR =
1.78% and FPR = 6.70%. So our system performs
high self and non-self discrimination under proper
threshold.
4.2 Robustness to Mimic Attacks
Generally, the resistance to various attack is a vital
issue to an authentication system. The traditional
authentication methods such as PIN code and
fingerprint identification, can be attacked in some
ways. For instance, if the user is recorded by a video
while typing PIN code, the password is easily to be
stolen; another research [10] showed that if someone
is photographed while waving hand, his fingerprint
can be restored by attacker only using the photo. So
our system should have resistance to these attacks.
We trained the system by 25 ”love”s written by a user
and tested 3 types of attack methods. The result is
shown in Fig 7(right).
4.2.1 Word attack
One of the simplest attack method is simulated by
letting the attacker only knows the word the user
using. We asked 15 attackers to write word ”love” by
their habit, for 10 trials each.
4.2.2 Script attack
This happens if the attacker gets the script the user
has written. For example, the user wrote the word on
a piece of paper for authentication and the attacker
got that paper. 15 attackers are asked to forge the
script, for 10 trials each.
4.2.3 All-simulating attack
If the attacker records a video of the user’s wrist
movement while the user is doing authentication, the
attacker might be able to simulate all the writing
process and finally pass the authentication. This
is the most threatening and challenging attack.
We recorded the video while the user was writing
password, and then let 15 attackers tried their best
to simulate the user’s writing for 10 trials each. Fig 8
shows that the ax curve is very close but the ωx curve
is distinct.
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Figure 7: FNR and FPR of test (left). and The
TSS of three types of attack (right).
The result shows that the TSS of attacker
increases since the attacker is getting more and
more information of user’s authentication process.
Through the attack simulation, we found that
although the attacking data can not be completely
distinguished from user’s test data, there is a
boundary lying between the TSS of attackers and
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Figure 8: Comparison between all-simulating attack
and authorized trail, ax (left) and ωx (right).
that of the authorized users. Taken together security
and convenience, the threshold is suggested to set
as δ = 0.65 although the TPR (True Positive Rate)
decreases to 82%. This means that in order to defend
attacks better, the TPR is sacrificed a little bit.
Fortunately, we came up with a practical method to
increase the TPR introduced in Section 4.4.
4.3 Fault Tolerance to Training Data
The authentication system is supposed to be well
trained by the user before being put into service.
However, the user might provide some unreasonable
training data: words written in abnormal ways. This
might happen for example when the user provides
the training data in hurry, or when he is interrupted
by others. So it is necessary to check the overall
performance of the system when there are improper
data mixed in the training data group, namely, the
fault tolerance.
We trained the system by 10 original trails and
added wrong trails to training groups little by little.
We chose 50 fine trails and 50 bad trails for testing.
The results of TPR and FNR are shown in Fig 9.
We can see that the TPR is always equal to 1 at the
beginning, because our algorithm gives more weights
to more similar trails when calculating the DTW
distance from a testing data to a group. The FNR
increases as the rate of bad data raises, because
the group ideal DTW distance cannot provide the
relative distance we want. Fortunately, we could
control the FNR under 5% if the percentage of wrong
data is below 50%. It’s a fine result, indicating that
our system is robust towards abnormal training data.
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Figure 9: Fault tolerance test.
4.4 Discrimination of Different
Motion Dimensions
In order to find out the discrimination of 6 motion
dimensions ax, ay, az, ωx, ωy, ωz, the AUC
(Area Under Curve) test is implemented for each
motion dimension basing on its ROC curve, the
results are shown in Fig 10. AUC value for
each motion dimension is: (A1, A2, · · · , A6) =
(0.8556, 0.9130, 0.9985, 0.9839, 0.9851, 0.8682) and
the total AUC is 0.947. The discrimination of an
motion dimension is better if the AUC value is higher,
so we distribute the weight µ based on AUC value.
We want the performance of our system to satisfy
at least AUC > 0.85 for each motion dimension.
Therefore, we distribute µ as:
Bi = min(Ai − 0.85, 0), µ(i) = Bi∑6
i=1Bi
.
And we got
µ = (0.0111, 0.1249, 0.2945, 0.2655, 0.2679, 0.0361).
Then we did the attack simulation in Section 4.2
again. The training set is composed of 10 samples
from one person and another 100 samples from 20
different persons, and the test set is composed of 40
samples from the first person. The result shows that
the FPR of all attacks is zero but the TPR increases
up to 90% when we still set threshold δ = 0.65. Even
8
if with threshold of δ = 0.62, we still can block all
the attacks, with TPR increasing to 94%. Also the
AUC value of the whole system increased to 0.983.
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Figure 10: The AUC test of each motion dimension.
4.5 Contrast with SVM
The support vector machine (SVM) has been widely
used in behavior-based authentication approaches,
and sometimes could achieve good results. Therefore,
we further contrast our approach with the SVM. We
will show the results and discuss the flaw of this
method. The SVM method was implemented for our
authentication scenario by following steps.
4.5.1 Feature extraction
Each trail has 6 motion dimensions, for each column
9 features are extracted.
• Statistical features: Mean value, Minimum and
Maximum value, Range, Variance, Kurtosis and
Skewness.
• Frequency-Domain features: Energy and
Entropy. Let v be the vector after Fast
Fourier Transformation (FFT), then Energy(v) =∑n
i=1 |vi|2 = vT v, Entropy(v) =
∑n
i=1 |vi|2 ln |vi|2.
• Additional features: We added two vectors Peak
and Dis as features. For N(N = 1000) times we
randomly chose 2 points in each motion dimension
and calculated their difference. The we got an
empirical probability distribution of the difference of
points in each motion dimension, calledDis. Another
feature, Peak, was the peak values of the trails.
Thus, there are totally 54 features plus 2 additional
vectors of features. For the first 54 features, they may
be strongly related. Since the feature dimension is
high, we use Lasso (`1 penalty) regression to extract
important features.
4.5.2 Feature selection
For the first 54 features, they may be strongly related.
In order to reduce time expense, we need to find
important and unrelated features. Fig 11 shows the
correlation matrix of them.
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Figure 11: Correlation matrix of 54 features.
The regularization method provides a very good
way to estimate the contribution of each feature.
Two popular regularization methods are `1(Lasso)
and `2(Ridge) regression. The linear method to find
parameter β is to directly minimize ‖Xβ−Y ‖22, while
the regularization method just adds one more item:
`1 : min
β
‖Xβ − Y ‖22 + λ‖β‖21
`2 : min
β
‖Xβ − Y ‖22 + λ‖β‖22
where λ is a given parameter. β given by `2 regression
shows the contribution of each feature(shown in
Fig 12 left); while β given by `1 regression tends to
be sparse(shown in Fig 12 right): if two important
features are strongly related, then only one of them
will be reported important.
9
Figure 12: β given by Lasso(left) and Ridge(right)
4.5.3 Applying SVM
Now we have 400 samples of 20 words with each word
written for 20 times. 5-cross validation was applied
and each time the mean precision was recorded; the
final mean average precision MAP equals to the
mean value of 5 recorded precisions.
Feature selection 54 features all features
None 95.4% 98.8%
Lasso 87.8% 98.8%
Table 1: MAP s with/without feature selection.
4.5.4 Flaw of SVM
However, compared to our method, SVM is hard to
detect abnormal points, in that provided a testing
data, SVM would classify it into one existed class,
even if the input is not supposed to be classified into
any of the existed group. This flaw makes it fairly
unreliable.
We collected 10 samples for each of the 10 different
words (not ”love”), and 20 samples for one additional
word ”love”, which is the password. Then we choose
some training data in each group and the rest are
testing data. Use SVM to train the training data and
then classify the testing data, then 5 of them (like
word ”book”) are classified as ”love”, which makes
the authentication extremely insecure!
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a new approach to
user authentication using the behavioral biometrics
provided by wrist-worn devices. Our approach
focuses on effective modeling methods to obtain
fine-grained writing-interaction metrics, which have
two advantages over other metrics. First, fine-grained
writing-interaction metrics can distinguish a user
accurately with very few strokes. Second, the
metrics are hard to attack even if the whole
authentication process are recorded in attackers’
video tape. Extensive experimental results show
that the proposed approach can identify users in
a convenient and accurate manner, making itself
suitable for online and mobile authentication.
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